Abstract
This article examines the nature and distinctive features of network warfare in Ukraine. It identifies the most vulnerable components of e-government and e-democracy and proposes immediate steps to avert the adverse effects of network warfare on the implementation of e-governance in Ukraine.
Introduction
Support for introducing e-governance in Ukraine grows each year. At the same time, expectations are rising regarding the quality of services, the ability to obtain and access information held by national and local authorities, and citizens’ participation in administrative decision-making. The country’s leadership is coming to recognise the importance of implementing e-governance and developing its main components. Particular emphasis is placed on learning from the European Union’s experience and on the need for coordinated action by all branches of government.
Before setting the immediate priorities for further implementation, however, it is necessary to examine the conditions in which this process will unfold.
As recently as 2013, progress towards e-democracy began to reverse amid the events surrounding the Revolution of Dignity. The adoption of the so-called draconian laws on 16 January 2014 made that reversal especially apparent. The laws restricted citizens’ participation in public decision-making, obstructed the development of civil society and curtailed freedom of peaceful assembly. At the same time, more attention went to introducing e-government components that could help the state monitor civil society at both the organisational and individual levels. Public authorities began creating assorted registers and personal-data databases particularly actively, without assigning responsibility for safeguarding them.
Following the shootings on the Maidan on 18–20 February 2014 and Yanukovych’s subsequent flight, Ukraine faced fundamentally different circumstances and new challenges that had to be taken into account in implementing e-governance. Elements of network warfare began to take shape after 2004 and spread more actively in 2010–2011. In 2014, network warfare emerged as the most serious threat to Ukraine’s national security and was continuing to gather pace.
Main findings
This study draws on Alexander Dugin’s analytical report on network warfare [3] to define the phenomenon and its main components. The concept of network-centric warfare and its operating principles were proposed by the US military at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The events unfolding in Ukraine, however, clearly reflect Russian approaches to the subject. The key feature of the network principle is that the model revolves around exchanging information. It extends the ways information is produced, accessed and distributed and the channels through which feedback is obtained.
Network warfare is a new form of warfare conducted primarily in the information sphere. It relies on a resonance effect, whereby outside actors direct seemingly unrelated ideological, civic, social, economic, ethnological and migration processes towards specific objectives. In Dugin’s account, network warfare undermines people’s fundamental understanding of their culture, society and state in order to create fear, disorientation and confusion. In the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, these effects are reinforced both by external threats, including bombardment, persecution, shortages and threats to life, and by manipulation through rumours, forged documents and the spread of panic. This gradually reorients people away from their traditional spiritual and cultural values and can ultimately destroy those values.
Russia has created a group of specialists for this purpose. Its members include some senior officials, highly motivated personnel from various security services, such as Girkin and Bezler, as well as intellectuals, scientists, engineers, political scientists, and journalists and cultural figures with a patriotic orientation. One task of the group is to develop and promote a Eurasian network that had already begun operating in numerous countries in support of the interests of the “Russian world”.
The tactics and strategy of Russian forces in occupied areas support the conclusion that Russia is waging network warfare against Ukraine. Combat operations, communications, information support, the shaping of public opinion, diplomacy, social processes, intelligence and counterintelligence, ethnopsychology, religious and collective psychology, economic support, academic research and technical innovation are interconnected parts of a Russian network that continually exchanges information. Failures in several of these links could jeopardise the network as a whole.
In network warfare the physical world becomes secondary to the virtual one. This helps explain the volume of false information circulating through Russian media and being shared on social networks. The central premise is that control of the information space confers control over everything else. Information therefore becomes integral to the purpose and substance of warfare, beyond its traditional supporting role as propaganda. At the outset of Russia’s military operation to seize Crimea, the information that the Information Resistance group provided to Ukrainians played an important role. The early seizure of radio and television transmission facilities and communications relays in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Russian mercenaries further illustrates this principle.
The primary contest in network warfare is for information superiority. As described in [5], it involves raising the adversary’s demand for information while curtailing its access, providing supporters and operatives with access through network mechanisms and feedback channels while guarding against infiltration, and reducing dependence on static information by providing access to a wide range of current, actionable information. The overall objective is therefore to gather as much varied information as possible, process it according to an appropriate procedure and make the decisions needed to prevail.
This must be considered in implementing e-governance in Ukraine, since its development depends on free and equal access to information held by public authorities. This is especially true of e-democracy, a major component whose development is threatened by network warfare. An emerging civil society offers a technically favourable environment for such warfare because the state imposes relatively limited regulation on its institutions. In those conditions, civil society institutions and their constituent groups can become a means of undermining and discrediting public authority and weakening state sovereignty outside the government’s direct control.
Non-governmental organisations, foundations, movements, expert networks, scientific communities, interest groups, institutions, and radical or intellectual centres can be enlisted in anti-Ukrainian activity by influencing public opinion. Some are already being used in this way.
According to Ukraine’s State Registration Service [4], 199 political parties had been registered by the end of 2013. Local justice authorities recorded 67,155 central bodies of civic organisations, of which 409 had nationwide status, as well as 599 civic unions, 5,746 trade unions, 1,133 trade-union associations and 10,482 charities. Charitable foundations represented 86% of the charities, charitable institutions 9%, and charitable societies 5%. Civic organisations that submitted reports recorded 35.5 million members, of whom 6.3 million, or 17.8%, were registered with the governing bodies of those organisations.
Registrations by justice authorities, first quarter of 2014
The figures cover registration of civic associations and refer to the statistical reporting of the main and territorial justice departments on legal recognition of associations and registration of print media.
| Type of organisation | Main justice departments, total | Main departments, registered in 2014 | District, city and combined departments, total | Local departments, registered in 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic organisations | 13,173 | 3 | 31,523 | 856 |
| Branches of nationwide and international civic organisations | 4,008 | — | 5,802 | — |
| Independent creative unions | 8 | — | 15 | — |
| Branches of nationwide creative unions | 245 | — | 15 | — |
| Organisational units of political parties | 4,706 | 27 | 153,407 | 41 |
| Charitable organisations | 3,111 | — | 2,234 | — |
| Branches of nationwide and international charities | 279 | — | 84 | — |
To prevent further harmful influence by civic organisations and associations, their activities in Ukraine and sources of funding should be examined carefully, with particular attention to the information they circulate on social networks. It is important to limit the spread of organisations whose activities destabilise Ukraine without restricting civil society’s development. One example is the Union of Citizens of Ukraine, formed and registered in 2011. Its activities subsequently intensified and included organising and supporting the so-called “people’s republics”.
Russia uses official propaganda through television, radio and online outlets in its war against Ukraine. It also relies on an extensive network of civic organisations and interest groups with a widespread presence on the Russian social network VKontakte, inside and outside Ukraine. It is difficult to determine what proportion of participants in these online groups are Ukrainian citizens genuinely expressing their own convictions. Most participants in anti-Ukrainian groups are citizens of other countries, predominantly Russia. A substantial share are trolls, and the use of chatbots has increased considerably. These practices destabilise the situation, undermine Ukraine and its armed forces, cause panic and foster a sense of impunity. The formation and operation of these groups in occupied territories make this particularly apparent.
Planning the further development of e-democracy in Ukraine therefore requires safeguards against these threats. This applies particularly to more active citizen participation in administrative decisions and influence over public policy. The draft Green Paper on E-Governance in Ukraine [1] regards three things as essential to a modern democracy: public access to government information, access for individuals and organisations to the information public authorities hold about them, and the ability to process open data from state information systems automatically. It proposes using information and communication technologies to facilitate such access and developing electronic petitions, signature collection for citizen initiatives, online submissions, consultation and surveys, and electronic voting.
A Razumkov Centre survey conducted from 12 to 18 September 2014 reported that more than 60% of Ukrainians visited government websites. Of those visitors, half looked for opening hours and documents needed for administrative services, while the other half sought advice. Twenty-four per cent of Ukrainian citizens wanted to be able to use online petitions to require the authorities to consider an issue and to submit suggestions on proposed decisions. Nineteen per cent were willing to take part in online consultations on local, regional and national policies, and 11% were willing to devote several hours a month to them. About 3% of Internet users in Ukraine were interested in discussing draft budgets and implementation reports at national and local levels, proposals and reports on public programmes at national and regional levels, regulatory impact forecasts or analyses, and draft legislation or regulations.
These forms of participation are important to e-democracy. In the context of network warfare against Ukraine, introducing them without adequate safeguards can have the opposite effect. The article cites a poll in the French newspaper Le Figaro on the sale of Mistral vessels to Russia [2]. Large-scale automated voting manipulated the survey. Of the 260,000 purported responses, 180,000 came from IP addresses showing signs of systems that send spam automatically. Most of those systems were registered in Russia. Although the newspaper’s technical team attempted to filter the spam, the results were falsified.
Implementing e-governance also requires considering the vulnerability of information resources and databases, including Ukrainian citizens’ personal data. The risk is particularly acute for people in occupied territories and participants in the anti-terrorist operation.
In 2013, Ukraine began developing a system for electronic interoperability among government information resources and produced a prototype. By connecting unified and state registers with other information resources, the system could simplify and accelerate the issuing of permits and other administrative services. The protection and contents of those databases and information resources require particular attention in the context of network warfare. Ukraine had 726 government information resources, 135 of them within central executive authorities. The Ministry of Justice maintained 17 unified and state registers, in the form of publicly owned electronic databases. The absence of a single national register of state information resources compounded the problem. Without common mandatory requirements and an overall national coordinator, interoperability among state resources remained poorly coordinated.
Electronic interaction between national and local authorities is particularly risky without appropriate protection. Some IT companies that might be involved in introducing it could have links to Russia. The previous government in Ukraine had actively promoted Russian IT companies.
The Unified State Portal for Administrative Services provided services electronically (http://poslugi.gov.ua). Identification on the portal was still unresolved. In December 2014, signing in required only a username and password. Some services cannot be delivered online without a reliable way to identify the user, which places further development of e-services at particular risk. A national electronic identification system could address this problem.
Conclusions and directions for further research
As Ukraine is experiencing network warfare, further steps to implement e-governance must be carefully considered to balance security and privacy protection. Even in peacetime, a lack of confidence that personal data will be safeguarded is a serious obstacle to e-governance. Addressing it requires changes to the relevant Ukrainian legal and regulatory instruments.
Most components of e-governance are vulnerable to external and internal threats during network warfare. The immediate priority is to develop identity verification mechanisms that meet current international requirements and use them to establish a national identification system. In view of Ukraine’s commitment to European integration, a suitable approach would be to implement the provisions of the eIDAS Regulation. The State Agency for E-Governance’s effort to develop a strategy for introducing modern electronic identification tools and schemes in Ukraine is a positive step.
Ukraine’s leading technical universities, including Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, should also collaborate to develop and introduce a domestic social network suited to national interests.
For the time being, questions outnumber answers. How can Ukraine reconcile national security with privacy protection, the development of e-democracy and success in network warfare? Are these the only issues? The central task is to use the benefits of e-governance in responding to this war while protecting its most vulnerable elements from foreign interference. In these circumstances, it is preferable to proceed more slowly if doing so keeps the process moving in the right direction.
References
- Draft Green Paper on E-Governance in Ukraine. E-transformation. http://etransformation.org.ua/2014/11/17/318/
- Ukrinform. Report on the attempted manipulation of Le Figaro’s poll on the Mistral vessels. http://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/rossiyane_pitalis_sfalsifitsirovat_opros_le_figaro_otnositelno_mistraley_1685395
- Dugin, A., with Korovin, V., and Bovdunov, A. Analytical report on network wars. http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/2319/
- State Registration Service of Ukraine. Statistics of the main and territorial justice departments on the legal recognition of civic associations and the registration of print media and information agencies, first quarter of 2014. http://www.drsu.gov.ua/show/12734
- Burke, M. (2000). Study on information superiority, network-centric warfare and operational advantage. Electronics and Surveillance Research Laboratory, Salisbury, Australia. http://hdl.handle.net/1947/4169
Extended abstract
In the network warfare Russia is waging in Ukraine at the time of writing, information gathering, influence over public opinion and disruption of national and local authorities are central concerns. The state must take these conditions into account when introducing e-governance. Information resources, databases and personal data are among the most vulnerable components, including data on people living in occupied areas or taking part in the anti-terrorist operation. Electronic services that depend on personal identification are vulnerable as well. The study considers social networks whose operation can run counter to national security interests and adversely affect e-democracy, especially open discussions of public affairs, opinion polls and the activities of some civic and human-rights organisations. To counter the adverse effects on e-governance, the immediate priorities are a national system for identifying citizens, protection of information and personal data, and measures to counter disruption.
Keywords: e-government, e-governance, e-democracy, electronic services, network warfare, personal-data protection, identification system.